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Abstrat The paper onstruts and investigates the models of the optimal
ontrol in the Tullok rent-seeking game. There are two types of ontrol in
the paper: an unlimited, but expensive resoure, and a heap, but an in-
nitely small resoure. Before the game starts, players disuss parameters
of the game, and then hoose their strategies simultaneously and indepen-
dently, ompeting for better rent. We onsider two types of players and two
types of ommuniation and analyze ombinations.
Keywords: optimal ontrol, Tullo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1. Introdution
Players disuss ompetition parameters for a prize and ompete by making ostly
investments and hoosing their strategies simultaneously and independently. Tul-
lok introdued his model to desribe how suh players make deisions, but only if
there were no negotiations and that the game parameters were ommon knowledge
(Tullok, 1980).
Previous results and this paper (Fedyanin, 2020) inorporates utility funtions
from the Tullok rent-seeking game but pay attention to unertainty and optimal
ontrol of players' beliefs. It provides tools to enrih investigations when players
might have dierent initial beliefs, types, and protools of preliminary negotiations
before the game start (Aumann, 1999). Previous investigations (Fedyanin, 2019)
introdued a model for the ommuniation and results of belief interations among
players. We onsidered two types of players and two types of ommuniation, and
we analyzed all possible ombinations. It leads us to the four unique ombinations
of types and ommuniations for analysis. We have suggested epistemi models for
all of them and alulated equilibriums for the rst three of them.
 Game 1 is a lassi Tullok rent-seeking game with ommon knowledge about
the parameters. The optimal ontrol is to ontrol the true values of parameters.
We onsider this ase as the simplest for omparison with other ontrols.
 Every player in Game 2 believes that all other players' beliefs and her beliefs
about the values of the parameters oinide, and it is ommon knowledge.
 Game 3 assumes a onsensus among players. Though players have initial beliefs,
they hange their beliefs to ome to a single belief in a onsensus. Though some
expressions are very similar to those in Game 1, the ontrol diers sine we have
to onsider the inuenes.
⋆
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 Every player in Game 4 knows all others' beliefs but believes that only his belief
is the true one. We do not investigate the optimal problem for this game sine
we ould not nd an equilibrium.
In the paper, we present the orresponding formal models for eah game with the
formal desription of the equilibriums onditions. These onditions are the systems
of equations.
This system is innite and might require ompliated analysis, but it has om-
patness for the Games 1-4. It means that there is only a nite number of equivalent
strategies.
The sizes of the orresponding systems are the following.
 The system is the same as the equation for the Nash equilibrium. Thus, n
equations for Game 1.
 The system inludes one system of n variables for eah player, thus n systems
of n equations for the Game 2.
 Though initial beliefs of players might be dierent - the onsensus redues the
system to a modiation of the Game 1. If there is no onsensus and the players
do not hange their beliefs than the system beomes the same as for Game 4.
Thus Game 1 and Game 3 might be examples of Game 3 if we do not assume
onsensus and require beliefs oinide with the real values of parameters. So, it
is n equations for Game 3.
 It is n equations for the Game 4.
Given these results, the paper fous on optimal ontrol of beliefs about param-
eters. The optimal ontrol problem in this paper is an optimization problem, where
 riteria of optimization is a funtion of strategies of players at the equilibria
 ontrol is a parameter of the game, whih is the parameter of the players'
strategies at the equilibria.
We analyze the best way of spending a tiny amount of a resoure to hange the
given beliefs and parameters of the game. Researh plans to nd an equilibrium
for a given informational struture and alulate the partial derivatives. The most
substantial partial derivative shows a belief or a parameter of the game, whih is the
rst to apply ontrol. We start from the straightforward models to show how the
ontrol algorithm works and proeed with the more sophistiated. We also provide
examples.
The paper uses the following known results:
1. the formulation of the Tullok ompetition and expression for equilibria (Tul-
lok, 1980),
2. the onept of beliefs (Harsanyi, 1967),
3. the onept of reetion game (Novikov et al. 2014),
4. the idea and formal model of weakening ommon knowledge required for the
game by lassifying the interation of players into four ombinations (Fedyanin,
2019),
5. the method to apply suh weakening to a game and appliation to the Tullok
ompetition (Fedyanin, 2020),
6. the idea and method of the linearization to nd a maximum of the riteria and
solve of ontrol problem (Neudeker et al., 1988),
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7. the methods to nd global optimum with restritions (Beavis et al. 1990; Curtis,
2015).
Previous results over a full hain of steps from 1 to 5, and the literature desribes
6 and 7. This paper applies methods from 6 and 7 to step 5. These results are new.
This paper fouses on ontrol problems that are a reasonable step forward from
previous investigations. We introdue two lasses of optimization:
 an innitely large amount of ontrol resoure, but there are quadrati expenses
for using it. We suggest the Laplae method to nd a global maximum.
 an innitely small amount of ontrol resoure; thus, we an linearize and apply
all ontrol to the ontrol parameter, whih derivative is greater than others.
2. Game
We onsider Tullok rent-seeking game with unertainty. There are appliations:
ompetition for monopoly rents, investments in R&D, ompetition for a promo-
tion/bonus, politial ontests. A formal model is as the following.
Reetive version of Tullok rent-seeking game ΓI is a game desribed
by the following tuple:
ΓI = {N, (Xi)i∈N , fi(·)i∈N , I}
where
 N = {1, . . . , n > 2} is a set of players,
 X = {X1, . . . , Xn} is a set of strategies of players, where Xi = {xi ≥ 0} is a set
of avalable strategies for the player i,
 F = {f1, . . . , fn}- is a set of the utility funtions suh that





where the restritions on the parameters are 0 < α < 1 ≤M.
An informational struture is a way to model unertainty by a tree where a
belief of an player is a node in the tree. This tree is innite in a general ase.
Information struture is represented by a tree. We denote
 (M,α, n)a1,...,ak beliefs of an player a1 about the belief of player a2 ... about
player ak about the values of (M,α, n). I = {(M,α, n)a1,...,ak∀a1, ..., ak ∈ N}.
We denote (Ma, αa, na) = (M,α, n)a. See Fig. 1.
 xa1,...,ak a strategy hosen by an image of player ak in a beliefs of an player
ak−1 ... in beliefs of an player a1. We assume that xa1,...,ak,j ∈ Xj
The equilibrium is a set of strategies of all images of players i
xa1,...,ak,i =
BRi((M,α, n)a1,...,ak , xa1,...,ak,1, ..., xa1,...,ak,i−1, ..., xa1,...,ak,i+1, ..., xa1,...,ak,n),
where BRi is the best response of the player i to the xed strategies of other players
with values of parameter aording to player's beliefs.
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Fig. 1. An example of an informational struture. It is similar to Harsanyie types approah
(Harsanyi, 1967/68)
We introdued four Games and have investigated the rst three of them.
In Game 1, there is a ommon knowledge, and we have to nd a solution for the
system of the best responses (BR) of the players.
x∗1 = BR1(x
∗





This solution gives us equilibrium.
In Game 2, players annot ommuniate. A brief example of this model is the
following. Let there are Ann and Bob. Ann wathes the TV hannel, and there is a
laim that there is a storm nearby. She ould think that it is suh important news
that everyone should know it. Bob does not know anything about the storm and
thinks that nobody thinks that there is a storm know. Both of them are wrong in
detail but make ations as they are right. We have to nd a solution for the system
of the best responses (BR) of the players.
x∗1 = BR(x
∗


















−n,Mj, nj , αj);
x∗n1 = BR(x
∗n












This solution gives us equilibrium.
In Game 3, players are allowed to ommuniate and reah onsensus. There
ould be ommuniation between players, and they an ommuniate aording to
the de Groot model (DeGroot, 1974; Gubanov et al., 2009). There is no dierene if
the existene of suh ommuniation to the ommon knowledge among all players,

















i are the nal inuenes (Gubanov et al., 2009) of the player i on
a soial network onsensus opinion about M,α, n
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This solution gives us equilibrium.
3. Optimal Control
We onsider two types of optimal ontrol: loal and global, and the restritions
on ontrol.
3.1. Unlimited, but Expensive Control Resoure
We look for optimal ontrol in the form of the maximum number of strategies of
players redued by the ontrol's quadrati expenses. The riteria for the optimiza-
tion are the following.
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For large enough n Hessian is negative denite and thus for large enough n there is
a maximum of F if the gradient is zero.
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The zero points of the gradient are ompliated, but there is a simple ondition



























(Mj −Mj0)2 + (αj − αj0)2 + (nj − nj0)2
)
.
If the Hessian is negative denite then the zeros of the gradient are loal maxi-
mums as in the Game 1. In this ase there are similar onditions on some parameters







We suggest that for large enough nk Hessian is negative denite sine the deter-
minant of a blok diagonal matrix is a produt of the determinants of its bloks. It
matters sine the Hessian here is a blok diagonal one.




































































The gradient will be zero if
n∗ − 1
n∗
α∗wMk = 2(Mk −Mk0);
n∗ − 1
n∗
M∗wαk = 2(αk − αk0);
2− n∗
(n∗)2
α∗M∗wnk = 2(nk − nk0);









∗ = 2(wαk − wαk0);
2− n∗
(n∗)2
α∗M∗ = 2(wnk − wnk0).
There are restritions: 0 < αk < 1, 1 < M, 0 < w
M
i < 1, 0 < w
α















j = 1. Restritions assumes that we should use
Lagrange multiplier in general ase or Boarded Hessian. These methods are well
known, though ompliated for our ase.
The Hessian an also be applied in the next setion if we use not linear but
quadrati approximation sine the orresponding Taylor series inlude Hessian.
3.2. Cheap, but Innitely Small Control Resoure
The riteria F onsists of ontinuous and disrete variables beause usually,
the number of players is disrete. However, if the number is large enough, we an
approximate it by a onstant value.
If there is only a small amount of a resoure, we annot apply the approah that
we use for unlimited resoures. In this ase, we rewrite the riteria as F =
∑
j xj




(Mj −Mj0)2 + (αj − αj0)2 + (nj − nj0)2
)
≤ R
for Game 2, ∑
j
(










When R is small enough we an alulate an opimal solution having derivatives




















and apply all ontrol to an argmax.
Game 1 Linearization leads to the following expression for the linear approximation














Given 0 < α < 1 ≤ M the expressions leads to a simple optimal ontrol rule that
is always spend all resoure to inrease α up to α = α0 + R if α0 < 1 − R. The
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if α0 > 1−R. The optimal ontrol is to spend resoure 1− α0 to inrease α up
to 1, and spend the rest to the inreasing M up to M = M0 + R − 1 + α0. The
inrease of the riteria F will be approximately
n0 − 1
n0
((1− α0)M0 + (R − 1 + α0)α0) .
Game 2 We an use the following expression for the linear approximation of the
































if n−∑j αj0 > R then the algorithm of the optimal ontrol is the following.
1. Assign M := N .
2. Choose an player from M with maximum Mk0(nk0 − 1)/n2k0 among all players
in M . Denote suh player by j
3. If 1−αj0 is larger then R then spend R to inrease αj up to αj = αj0 +R and
exit.
4. If 1−αj0 is smaller than R or equals it then spend 1−αj0 to inrease αj up to
αj = 1,
5. Assign R := R− 1 + αj0
6. Exlude j from M , and if M is not empty and R > 0 go to step b.
Game 3 We an use the following expression for the linear approximation of the
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4. Conlusion
The paper provides the solutions for speial ases of the optimal problems for
Tullok rent-seeking game with preliminary negotiations when there are unlimited
large or innitely small amounts of ontrol resoures. The solution for the stubborn
players with ommuniation (Game 4) is unknown sine there is no known expres-
sion for equilibrium. There are known straight, but ompliated ways to solve the
optimization problem in general, but the investigation obtained simple expressions
for some ritial ases. This paper makes an essential step at the transition from the
previously obtained expressions for parametrized equilibrium to the solved ontrol
problems.
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Appendix. Parametrized equilibriums
1. Game 1. Players with ommon knowledge




αM ; ∀i ∈ N.
Furthermore, the following derivatives will be monotoniity ould be found by an

































2. Game 2. Players without ommuniation




































Models of Optimal Control in Tullok Rent-Seeking Game 141
3. Game 3. Players with ommuniation and onsensus
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